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STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR CITIZEN SUITS,
UNDER THE CLEAN WATER ACT
The pollution control statutes of the 1970s contain an effective
enforcement provision-the citizen suit.1 These statutes marked the
first time that federal law expressly empowered citizens to vindicate
the rights of the general public, rather than to protect their own
economic interests. 2 Recently, citizen enforcement of the Clean
Water Act3 (the Act) has exploded.4 In 1983 and early 1984 citizens
filed 195 suits and notices of intent to sue, 5 almost five times the
number filed during the previous five years. 6 Citizen suits are now
initiated almost as frequently as federal enforcement actions. Be-
tween January 1983 and April 1984, private entities filed approxi-
mately ten enforcement actions for every thirteen filed by the
Environmental Protection Agency (the EPA). 7 Industries regulated
by the Act have responded to citizen enforcement actions with a va-
riety of defenses. 8 These include lack of standing,9 inadequacy of
I Citizen suit provisions allow a person whose environment was affected by some-
one violating a federal environmental law to sue the violator in federal court to compel
compliance with the law and in some instances to collect penalties on behalf of the
United States Treasury. These provisions also allow private parties to challenge nondis-
cretionary actions of the administrating agency. For a discussion of the citizen suit pro-
vision in the Clean Water Act, see infra notes 29-39 and accompanying text.
2 Environmental statutes are unique, not because they permit private enforce-
ment, but because they do not provide for private damages. See Miller, Private Enforce-
ment of Federal Pollution Control Laws (pt. 1), 13 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,309
(1983).
3 Federal Water Pollution Control (Clean Water) Act Amendments of 1972, Pub.
L. No. 92-500, §§ 101-518, 86 Stat. 816,816-96; 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982 & Supp.
III 1985).
4 See Fadil, Citizen Suits Against Polluters: Picking Up the Pace, 9 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV.
23, 34-35 (1985); Miller, Private Enforcement of Federal Pollution Control Laws (pt. 2), 14
Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,063 (1984); Schwartz & Hackett, Citizen Suits Against
Private Industry Under the Clean Water Act, 17 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 327 (1984); Moore,
Private Suits Flood Companies Under Clean Water Provision, Legal Times, May 7, 1984, at 1,
col. 2.
5 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE, CITIZEN SUITS: AN ANALYSIS OF CITIZEN EN-
FORCEMENT ACTIONS UNDER EPA-ADMINISTERED STATUTES III-10 (fig. D) (1984).
6 Citizens initiated 41 actions between 1978 and 1983. Id.
7 In 1983 and the first four months of 1984, 88 civilian lawsuits (not mere notices)
were filed, id., as compared with 118 filed by the Department ofJustice for the EPA. Id.
at 111-29 (table 5).
8 See generally Fadil, supra note 4, at 38-52; Schwartz& Hackett, supra note 4, at 338-
52.
9 See, e.g., Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453
U.S. 1 (1981) (no implied private right of action under Act; plaintiff must demonstrate
real injury or threat of real injury); Sierra Club v. SCM Corp., 747 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1984)
(§ 505 of Act does not eliminate injury in fact requirement for standing). The Sea Clam-
mers Court cited the general test for standing set forth in Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S.
195
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notice,' 0 mootness or lack of authority to sue for past violations,"
preemption by administrative enforcement, 12 and failure to meet
statutes of limitations.1 3
The Act does not provide a statute of limitations for either citi-
zen or government enforcement actions. 14 When a federal statute is
silent, courts must decide what, if any, limitation period should ap-
ply. Whether a citizen or government suit, courts' decisions involve
much the same considerations. Several federal district courts1 5 have
held that the normal practice of borrowing state statutes of limita-
tions should not be applied to cases under the Act because doing so
would frustrate the congressional goal of nationally uniform en-
forcement. These same courts, however, disagree on two issues:
(1) whether the same rule should apply to both citizen and govern-
ment suits, and (2) whether the courts should borrow a limitation
period or periods from elsewhere in federal law or leave the time for
enforcement actions unlimited.
Resolution of these two issues first requires investigation of the
history, policy, and goals of the Act, and the general purposes
served by statutes of limitations. The next step in the analysis is to
determine what alternatives are available to federal courts when
they are confronted with a statute that fails to specify a limitation
period. This Note examines these aspects of the Clean Water Act's
citizen suit provision and concludes that the same limitation period
should govern both citizen and EPA enforcement actions, and that
727 (1972). 453 U.S. at 16-17. In Sierra Club, the Court had stated that "the 'injury in
fact' test requires more than an injury to a cognizable interest. It requires that the
[plaintiff] be himself among the injured." 405 U.S. at 734-35. For further discussion of
standing under the Clean Water Act, see Fadil, supra note 4, at 38-41; Miller, supra note
2, at 10,314-17.
10 See Miller, supra note 4, at 10,063-67 (discussion of notice requirement with case
citations); Note, Notice by Citizen Plaintiffs in Environmental Litigation, 79 MICH. L. REv. 299
(1980).
11 See, e.g., Hamker v. Diamond Shamrock Chem. Co., 756 F.2d 392 (5th Cir. 1985)
(continuing violation required); Student Pub. Interest Research Group of NJ., Inc. v.
Monsanto Co., 600 F. Supp. 1474, 1476-77 (D.NJ. 1985) (continuing violation not re-
quired); Fadil, supra note 4, at 44 (discussion of jurisdiction when violation is
noncontinuing).
12 See Polebaum & Slater, Preclusion of Citizen Environmental Enforcement Litigation by
Agency Action, 16 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,013 (1986) and cases cited therein.
13 See cases cited infra note 84; see also Fadil, supra note 4, at 50-51.
A statute of limitations is "[a] statute prescribing limitations to the right of action
on certain described causes of action .... ; that is, declaring that no suit shall be main-
tained on such causes of action.., unless brought within a specified period of time after
the right accrued." BLAcx's LAw DicToNARY 1077 (5th ed. 1979).
14 Seegenerally Clean Water Act §§ 101-518, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982 & Supp.
III 1985). No environmental statute provides a limitation period for citizen suits. See
Miller, supra note 2, at 10,311 n.12 (listing statutes).
15 See cases cited infra note 84.
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courts should adopt the generic federal five year limitation period
for penalties.
I
BACKGROUND
A. The Clean Water Act
1. General Structure
When Congress enacted the Clean Water Act, it expressly in-
tended to institute nationally uniform pollution control standards
and enforcement. 16 To achieve this goal, Congress empowered the
EPA to set national "effluent standards" fixing the maximum lawful
discharge of certain pollutants. 17 Any discharge exceeding the
promulgated effluent limitations violates the Act and subjects the
discharger to enforcement proceedings. 18 Although the states bear
initial enforcement responsibility, ultimate enforcement authority
resides with the EPA Administrator. 19 By combining national stan-
dards with ultimate federal enforcement, Congress sought to elimi-
nate the tendency of states to compete for industrial investment and
jobs by offering lenient pollution control policies.20 Congress in-
16 See Letter from William Ruckelshaus, EPA Administrator, to the Office of Man-
agement and Budget (Oct. 11, 1972) (recommending presidential approval of Act in
order to promote uniform enforcement), reprinted in CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE
OF THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, 93D CONG., IST SESs., A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1972, at 156-57 (1973) [hereinafter
CLEAN WATER HISTORY]; 118 CONG. REC. 33,693 (1972) (statement of Sen. Muskie) (uni-
formity and enforceability are two chief concerns of Act), reprinted in CLEAN WATER HIS-
TORY, supra, at 162-63; American Frozen Food Inst. v. Train, 539 F.2d 107, 129 (D.C.
Cir. 1976) ("plainly expressed purpose of Congress [is] to require nationally uniform...
limitations").
17 Clean Water Act § 304(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b) (1982). For an explanation of
effluent limitations and the EPA's duties under § 304, see 1 F. GRAD, TREATISE ON ENVI-
RONMENTAL LAW § 3.03[4] (1986). Cf. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train,
510 F.2d 692, 709 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (as modified 1975) (effluent standards intended to
safeguard against industries' threats to relocate).
18 Clean Water Act § 301(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (1982). See, e.g., United States v.
Cutter Laboratories, Inc., 413 F. Supp. 1295 (E.D. Tenn. 1976).
19 See, e.g., Clean Water Act § 101(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (1982) (pollution pre-
vention is primary responsibility of states); id. § 402(c)(3), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(c)(3) (EPA
may withdraw state's authority to issue discharge permits if state fails to enforce stan-
dards). If the Administrator finds that a person has violated an effluent standard or any
other condition of the Act, the Administrator may notify the person and the affected
state. If the state fails to bring an enforcement action within 30 days, the EPA may
proceed with enforcement itself. Id. § 309(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a)(1) (1982).
20 During the House debates on the 1972 amendments to the Federal Water Pollu-
tion Control Act, Rep. Podell noted that "[i]nterstate competition for ... industrial
investment, with its emphasis on noninterference .... flexible environmental policies
and languid enforcement, is well known... [and the] pressures may be too strong for
economically conscious State officials to resist." 118 CONG. REC. 10,661 (1972), reprinted
in CLEAN WATER HISTORY, supra note 16, at 575.
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tended through the Act to ensure uniform minimum standards
nationwide. 21
Section 402 of the Act establishes the basic mechanism for en-
forcing the effluent standards-the National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System (NPDES). 22 Section 402 authorizes the EPA to
issue permits allowing discharge of pollutants at or below the
promulgated standards. 23 Each permit effectively translates the
general effluent standards into specific discharge limitations. 24
The Act allows delegation of the permit program to states that
demonstrate the capacity to administer their own State Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System (SPDES). 25 Approval of a state's pro-
gram requires that it demonstrate adequate authority under state
laws to administer the program, including authority to issue and en-
force permits.26 If state laws or enforcement become too lenient,
the EPA may withdraw a state's permitting authority.2 7 In addition,
the EPA may bring enforcement actions against individuals who vio-
late either their state permit or the federal effluent standards. 28
Thus, ultimate enforcement authority remains with the federal
government.
21 States are free to establish more stringent effluent standards or enforcement pro-
cedures. Clean Water Act § 510, 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (1982).
22 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1982). The NPDES is a codification of the permit program
previously established by regulation under the Rivers and Harbors Act, ch. 425, § 13, 30
Stat. 1121, 1152 (1899) (current version at 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1982)). See Exec. Order No.
11,574, 3 C.F.R. 556 (1971), reprinted in 33 U.S.C. § 407 app. at 638-39 (1982); Clean
Water Act § 402(a)(4)-(5), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(4)-(5) (1982) (indicating that § 402 sup-
ports the § 407 permit scheme).
23 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1) (1982). Section 301(a) of the Act articulates the policy
that no discharge is allowed except under permits approved by the Act. 33 U.S.C.
§ 1311(a) (1982). The NPDES permits are such permits. Id.
24 The NPDES permit sets forth limitations on the amount of certain pollutants a
source may discharge. NPDES permits require that each permittee monitor its dis-
charge and submit Discharge Monitoring Reports (DMRs) to the issuing agency at peri-
odic intervals. DMRs thus indicate whether the permittee violated the permit limits
during the reporting period. In addition to monitoring and reporting requirements and
effluent limitations, NPDES permits may impose other constraints deemed necessary by
the issuing agency. See EPA Administered Permit Programs: The National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System, 40 C.F.R. § 122 (1986); Clean Water Act § 402(a)(2), 33
U.S.C. § 1342(a)(2) (1982).
25 Clean Water Act § 402(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (1982).
26 Id. The EPA has approved 36 state and one territory permit programs. States
Having Approved Programs for the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES), [1
State Water Laws] Env't Rep. (BNA) 611:0111 (Dec. 7, 1984).
27 See Clean Water Act § 402(c)(3), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(c)(3) (1982); see also Kentucky
v. Train, 9 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1280 (E.D. Ky. 1976) (overturning state standards less
stringent than those required by Act).
28 See generally Clean Water Act § 309(a)(1)-(3), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a)(1)-(3) (1982)
(EPA may take action when state has failed). See also id. § 402(i), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(i)
(1982) ("Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit the authority of the Adminis-
trator to take action pursuant to [Clean Water Act § 309] section 1319 of this title.").
[Vol. 72:195
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2. The Citizen Suit Provision
As a supplement to federal and state enforcement, section 505
of the Act provides for private enforcement via citizen SUits. 2 9
Modeled closely upon the citizen suit provision in the Clean Air
Act,30 section 505 empowers a citizen to act as a private attorney
general 3' to vindicate public rights. The citizen cannot, however,
29 Section 505, as codified, provides in part:
(a) Authorization; jurisdiction
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, any citizen may
commence a civil action on his own behalf-
(1) against any person... who is alleged to be in violation of(A) an
effluent standard or limitation under this chapter or (B) an order issued
by the Administrator or a State with respect to such a standard or limita-
tion, or
(2) against the Administrator where there is alleged a failure of the
Administrator to preform any act or duty under this chapter which is not
discretionary with the Administrator.
The district courts shall have jurisdiction.., to enforce such an effluent
standard or limitation, or such an order, or to order the Administrator to
perform such act or duty ... and to apply any appropriate civil penalties
under section 1319(d) of this title.
(b) Notice
No action may be commenced -
(1) under subsection (a)(1) of this section-
(A) prior to sixty days after the plaintiff has given notice of the
alleged violation (i) to the Administrator, (ii) to the State in which the
alleged violation occurs, and (iii) to any alleged violator of the standard,
limitation, or order, or
(B) if the Administrator or State has commenced and is dili-
gently prosecuting a civil or criminal action.., to require compliance
with the standard, limitation, or order, but in any such action in a court of
the United States any citizen may intervene as a matter of right.
(2) under subsection (a)(2) of this section prior to sixty days after
the plaintiff has given notice of such action to the Administrator ....
(c) Venue; intervention by Administrator
(2) In such action under this section, the Administrator, if not a
party, may intervene as a matter of right.
33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1982).
30 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1982); see S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. 79 (1971)
(citizen suit provision modeled after that in Clean Air Act), reprinted in CLEAN WATER
HISTORY, supra note 16, at 1415, 1497.
Because the citizen suit originated with the Clean Air Act of 1970, courts routinely
rely on its legislative history in construing the citizen suit provision of the Clean Water
Act. See, e.g., Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Assoc., 453
U.S. 1, 18 n.27 (1981); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 510 F.2d 692,
699-702 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (as modified 1975). Courts also rely on cases involving citizen
suits under both statutes when considering citizen suits under one of them. See, e.g.,
Student Pub. Interest Research Group of N.J., Inc. v. Fritzsche, Dodge & Olcott, Inc.,
759 F.2d 1131, 1135-37 & 1136 n.4 (3d Cir. 1985) (using cases involving citizen suits
under Clean Air Act to interpret citizen suit provision of Clean Water Act).
31 See H.R. REP. No. 911, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 134 (definition of "citizen" based on
"private attorney general" doctrine), reprinted in CLEAN WATER HISTORY, supra note 16, at
753, 821. See generally Mashaw, Private Enforcement of Public Regulatory Provisions: The "Citi-
zen Suit, "4 CLASS AcTION REP. 29 (1975).
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recover damages for his or her own injury.
The citizen suit provision grants limited jurisdiction to private
enforcers. 32 It authorizes a citizen to sue any person violating either
an "effluent standard or limitation" 33 or an order of the Administra-
tor or the state.34 In addition, a citizen may challenge purely non-
discretionary actions of the Administrator.35 The citizen must give
the alleged violator, the EPA, and the state sixty days notice before
commencing a suit.3 6 Diligent prosecution during this period by the
state or EPA preempts citizen enforcement. 37 Section 505 allows a
citizen to seek an injunction or an assessment of penalties. 38 Sec-
tion 505 does not, however, create a private right of action to collect
damages; penalties are payable to the United States treasury, not to
32 The Supreme Court has noted that the Senate reports concerning the 1972
Clean Water Amendments "placed particular emphasis on the limited nature of the citi-
zen suits being authorized." Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clam-
mers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 17 n.27 (1981). To prevent a flood of citizen suits, Congress
specifically made no provision for damages to individuals, limiting the type of relief that
citizens could seek to civil penalties and injunctive relief. See id. (citing legislative
history).
33 Clean Water Act § 505(a)(1)(A), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1)(A) (1982). The term
"effluent standard or limitation" for the purpose of citizen suits under the Act is defined
in id. § 505(0, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(f) (1982). In general, "citizens may enforce against
discharges which lack . . . §§ 402 [NPDES/SPDES] or 404 [dredge and fill] permits;
violations of ... §§ 402 or 404 permits; and violations of new source, toxic pollutant,
and pretreatment standards. They may not enforce against... § 311 oil or hazardous
materials spill requirements and prohibitions; . . .§ 312 marine sanitation device re-
quirements; or... § 405 sludge disposal and permit requirements." Miller, supra note
2, at 10,320-21 (footnotes omitted).
34 Clean Water Act § 505(a)(1)(B), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1)(B) (1982).
35 Id. § 505(a)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(2) (1982).
In general, the Administrator's enforcement decisions are discretionary and citizen
suits therefore cannot compel administrative enforcement action. See, e.g., City of Sea-
brook v. Costle, 659 F.2d 1371 (Former 5th Cir. Unit A Oct. 1981); Committee for the
Consideration of theJones Falls Sewage Sys. v. Train, 539 F.2d 1006 (4th Cir. 1976). But
see South Carolina Wildlife Fed'n v. Alexander, 457 F. Supp. 118 (D.S.C. 1978) (allega-
tions that EPA Administrator had duty to enjoin construction of dam stated claim for
relief); Illinois ex rel. Scott v. Hoffman, 425 F. Supp. 71 (S.D. Il. 1977) (denying Admin-
istrator's summary judgment motion in suit against him seeking to restore river via in-
junctive relief). The courts have, however, allowed citizen suits to make the EPA
withdraw permitting authority from a state not actively enforcing the water laws. See,
e.g., Rivers Unlimited v. Costle, 11 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1681 (S.D. Ohio 1978) (suit to
compel enforcement of Ohio SPDES permit program).
36 Clean Water Act § 505(b)(1)(A), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(A) (1982).
37 Id. § 505(b)(1)(B), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(B) (1982). The circuits disagree as to
whether "diligent prosecution" requires court action or only administrative action. For
an analysis of this issue and case citations, see Polebaum & Slater, supra note 12.
38 Clean Water Act § 505(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1982). The penalties are the
same as those allowed under the federal enforcement section, id. § 309(d), 33 U.S.C.
§ 1319(d) (1982). Only the Clean Water Act authorizes penalties when citizens sue
under environmental statutes. The legislative history does not explain this aberration.
See Miller, supra note 2, at 10,319.
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the private plaintiff.3 9
Congress designed the citizen suit primarily as a means of
prompting government enforcement and only incidentally as an al-
ternative enforcement mechanism. 40 By requiring that a citizen no-
tify the government before filing suit,4 1 Congress sought to trigger
administrative action and thus avoid the necessity of judicial in-
volvement.42 Congress promoted enforcement uniformity by pro-
viding identical standards and remedies for EPA and citizen suits
under the Act;43 whether the plaintiff is a private party or the federal
agency, the court may impose penalties authorized under section
309(d)44 or issue an injunction against continuing violations.45 The
39 Clean Water Act § 505(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1982); see also Sierra Club v. SCM
Corp., 580 F. Supp. 862 (W.D.N.Y.) (no private right of action for damages; all fines
accrue to federal government), aft'd, 747 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1984); City of Philadelphia v.
Stepan Chem. Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (same).
40 Senator Muskie explained that "[a]lthough the Senate did not advocate these
[citizen] suits as the best way to achieve enforcement, it was clear that they should be an
effective tool." 116 CONG. REC. 42,382 (1970), reprinted in CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH
SERVICE OF THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, 93D CONG., 2D SESS., A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
THE CLEAN AIR AMENDMENTS OF 1970, at 127 (1974) [hereinafter CLEAN AIR HISTORY];
see also S. REP. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 36-37 ("Government initiative in seeking
enforcement under the Clean Air Act has been restrained. Authorizing citizens to bring
suits for violations ... should motivate governmental... enforcement and abatement
proceedings."), reprinted in CLEAN AIR HISTORY, supra, at 397, 436-37.
Critics of the provision feared that such suits would flood the courts and interfere
with the enforcement role of the executive branch. See, e.g., 116 CONG. REC. 32,923-26
(1970) (statement of Sen. Hruska), reprinted in CLEAN AIR HISTORY, supra, at 273-79. For
a reply to Sen. Hruska, see id. at 33,104-05 (statement of Sen. Hart), reprinted in CLEAN
AIR HISTORY, supra, at 355-57.
41 Clean Water Act § 505(b)(1)(A)(i), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(A)(i) (1982).
42 Senator Muskie explained that the reason for the notice provision was "that [the
citizen] might trigger administrative action to get the relief that he might otherwise seek
in the courts." 116 CONG. REC. 32,927 (1970), reprinted in CLEAN AIR HISTORY, supra
note 40, at 280. Senator Hart agreed, recognizing that notice would "have the effect of
prodding [state and federal pollution] agencies to act. In many cases, it is hoped, they
will be able to act without resorting to the courts." Id. at 33,104, reprinted in CLEAN AIR
HISTORY, supra note 40, at 355. See also City of Highland Park v. Train, 519 F.2d 681,
690-91 (7th Cir. 1975) ("Congress intended to provide for citizens' suits in a manner
that would be least likely to clog ... federal courts and most likely to trigger governmen-
tal action which would alleviate any need for judicial relief.").
43 Clean Water Act § 505(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1982) (in citizen suits, just as in
EPA-filed actions, district courts are authorized to enforce Act and apply penalties au-
thorized under id. § 309(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) (1982), the federal enforcement sec-
tion); see also infra notes 100-10 and accompanying text; cf. Environmental Defense Fund,
Inc. v. Lamphier, 714 F.2d 331, 337 (4th Cir. 1983) (under citizen suit provision, 42
U.S.C. § 6972 (1982 & Supp. III 1985), of Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of
1976, district court authorized to enforce RCRA regulations or orders, presumably to
full extent of court's powers); Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 535 F.2d 165, 173 (2d Cir.
1976) (district courts obligated to issue appropriate enforcement orders-injunctions-
once citizen plaintiff has demonstrated that state has violated Clean Air Act).
44 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) (1982) (civil penalties not to exceed $10,000 per day of
violation).
45 Clean Water Act § 505(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1982). The Act authorizes
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citizen-plaintiff is a surrogate for the EPA: he or she enforces the
Act where the state has failed and obtains the same remedies as the
Agency.
B. Statutes of Limitations
1. Purposes Served by Statutes of Limitations
Courts and commentators generally give three reasons for stat-
utes of limitations: (1) to ensure fairness to the defendant, (2) to
enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of the courts, and (3) to
promote societal stability.46 Fairness to the defendant is the primary
reason given for limiting the life of an action.47 Statutes of limita-
tions are said to promote justice by balancing the right of the plain-
tiff to assert "a just claim" against the right of the defendant "to be
free of stale claims." 48 The theory stresses the unfairness of leaving
a defendant indefinitely under the threat of a lawsuit.49
Courts also have an interest in limiting the period in which a
plaintiff may bring an action. Allowing claims to languish until "evi-
dence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have dis-
appeared" 50 frustrates the factfinding process. In addition, a time
limit on claims conserves judicial resources by eliminating old and
tenuous claims. 51
Finally, limitations on the timeliness of lawsuits contribute to
societal stability. Many people may be reluctant to deal with those
courts "to enforce" those requirements which have been violated. Courts have primar-
ily enforced these requirements by issuing injunctions. See Miller, supra note 4, at
10,075-79 (listing relevant cases and discussing injunctions under environmental stat-
utes); see also Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 316 (1982) (courts retain
their equitable power to impose injunctive relief under Clean Water Act).
46 For discussions of the reasons for placing temporal limits on causes of action, see
Burnett v. New York Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424, 428 (1965); Callahan, Statutes of Limita-
lion-Background, 16 OHIo ST. LJ. 130 (1955); Developments in the Law-Statutes of Limita-
tions, 63 HARv. L. REV. 1177, 1185-86 (1950) [hereinafter Developments]; Special Project,
Time Bars in Specialized Federal Common Law: Federal Rights ofAction and State Statutes of Limi-
tations, 65 CORNELL L. REV. 1011 (1980).
47 Developments, supra note 46, at 1185; Note, Accrual Dilemma: Statutes of Limitations in
Hazardous Waste Cases, 45 ALB. L. REv. 717, 718 (1981).
48 Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 349
(1944).
49 See Adams v. Woods, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 336, 342 (1805) (unfair for defendant to
"remain forever liable to a pecuniary forfeiture"); Developments, supra note 46, at 1185
(defendant has reasonable expectation that "the slate has been wiped clean of ancient
obligations").
50 Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 349
(1944).
51 See Burnett v. New York Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424, 428 (1965) ("[Clourts ought
to be relieved of the burden of trying stale claims .... "); Developments, supra note 46, at
1185 (statutes of limitations increase effectiveness of courts); cf. Callahan, supra note 46,
at 135 (arguing that limitation periods are devices to save the court's time and, con-
versely, that they are meant to serve fairness rather than efficiency).
202 [Vol. 72:195
1986] CLEAN WATER ACT- STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 203
whose status is uncertain because of unsettled claims. Statutes of
limitations minimize this uncertainty.5 2
2. Limitation Borrowing in Federal Courts
When a federal law fails to specify a statute of limitations,5 3 fed-
eral courts borrow an analogous state limitation period 54 or a pe-
riod found elsewhere in federal law,55 or decide that the time for
bringing an action is unlimited.5 6 Most often, courts borrow a limi-
tation period from an analogous state law.5 7 Courts justify such
borrowing as the appropriate interpretation of congressional in-
tent 58 or as required by the Rules of Decision Act.59
Although borrowing a state limitation period remains the gen-
eral rule, the Supreme Court has often held that federal courts
should not mechanically apply the rule.60 In Occidental Life Insurance
Co. v. EEOC,61 for example, the Court ruled that state time limits
should not be applied to federal statutory actions if such application
is inconsistent with the statute's underlying national policies. 62 The
Court reasoned that "[s]tate legislatures do not devise their limita-
52 See Developments, supra note 46, at 1185-86.
53 For a complete discussion of the alternatives available to federal courts, see
Note, Limitation Borrowing in Federal Courts, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1127, 1130-46 (1979). In
addition to the alternatives discussed infra, the Note also discusses "judicially legislated
limitations," id. at 1131-32, and laches, id. at 1141-46.
54 Id. at 1134.
55 Id. at 1133.
56 Id. at 1130.
57 See, e.g., Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 179-82 (1976) (applying state per-
sonal injury limitation period to claim under Civil Rights Act of 1866); UAW v. Hoosier
Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 703-08 (1966) (applying state limitation period for con-
tracts not in writing to claim under Labor Management Relations Act); Chattanooga
Foundry & Pipe Works v. City of Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390, 397-99 (1906) (applying state
catch-all statute of limitations to antitrust claim under Sherman Act); M'Cluny v. Sil-
liman, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 270, 277-78 (1830) (applying state limitation period to claim
under federal act concerning sale of federal lands).
58 See, e.g., UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 704 (1966); Holmberg v.
Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 395 (1946); see also DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Team-
sters, 462 U.S. 151, 174 & n.1 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
59 The Supreme Court first applied the Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652
(1982), to require use of a state statute of limitations in M'Cluny v. Silliman, 28 U.S. (3
Pet.) 270 (1830). The Court has since limited the Act's application when adjudicating
federally created rights. See DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 159 n.13. See generally Special Project,
supra note 46, at 1024-42 (discussion that early interpretation of Rules of Decision Act
required applying state limitation periods to federal claims).
60 See, e.g., DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 161; Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S.
355, 367 (1977);Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 465 (1975); UAW v.
Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 706-07 (1966).
61 432 U.S. 355 (1977).
62 Id. at 367 (citingJohnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 465 (1975));
see also UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 706-07 (1966) ("[T]he characteri-
zation that [the state] law imposes upon this [federal] action does not lead to any conflict
with federal labor policy.").
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tions periods with national interests in mind, and it is the duty of the
federal courts to assure that the importation of state law will not
frustrate or interfere with the implementation of national
policies." 63
Applying this reasoning in DelCostello v. International Brotherhood
of Teamsters,64 the Supreme Court approved application of an analo-
gous federal limitation period to a federal statutory claim.65 In an
action under the federal Labor Management Relations Act
(LMRA), 66 the Court rejected the suggested state limitation period
and adopted a longer time period provided elsewhere in the LMRA
but not specifically applicable to the hybrid claim before the
Court.67 Although recognizing that borrowing state law remains the
general practice, 68 the Court nevertheless stated that courts should
not feel inextricably bound to this practice "when a rule from else-
where in federal law clearly provides a closer analogy than available
state statutes, and when the federal policies at stake and the practi-
calities of litigation make that rule a significantly more appropriate
vehicle for interstitial lawmaking." 69
Finally, courts view dispensing with a time limit for a cause of
action as undesirable.70 When a cause of action lives forever, the
legal system forgoes the benefits of fairness, stability, and efficiency
that limitation periods provide.7' Moreover, although many federal
statutes are unlimited, Congress has not objected to the general ju-
dicial practice of borrowing state limitation periods, a silence which
courts have "interpreted [as a] ... federal policy to adopt the local
law of limitation." 72
63 Occidental Life, 432 U.S. at 367.
64 462 U.S. 151 (1983).
65 Id. at 169.
66 The claim consisted of allegations of breach of contract against the employer
under 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1982) and breach of union duty of fair representation.
67 DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 169. The court found the analogy to a federal statute of
limitations "more apt than any of the suggested state-law parallels." Id.
68 Id. at 171 ("[R]esort to state law remains the norm .... ").
69 Id. at 172. Cf. Mola Dev. Corp. v. United States, No. CV 82-819-RMT(JRx), slip
op. at 3 (C.D. Cal. July 30, 1985) (in Superfund case, court, citing DelCostello, reasoned
that analogous federal time limitation could be found, but because analogous federal
and state periods were identical, court did not specify which it would choose).
70 See supra note 49. Chief Justice Marshall warned that having no limitation on
rights of action would be "utterly repugnant to the genius of our laws." Adams v.
Woods, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 336, 342 (1805) (dictum).
71 See supra notes 46-52 and accompanying text.
72 Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 395 (1946); see DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 158
(absent federal statute of limitations, "we do not ordinarily assume that Congress in-
tended that there be no time limit on actions at all"); UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp.,
383 U.S. 696, 704 (1966) (if Congress disagrees with practice of borrowing state limita-
tion periods, it can act to overturn that practice); Moviecolor Ltd. v. Eastman Kodak Co.,
288 F.2d 80, 83 (2d Cir.) (although Congress may create federal right without limitation
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3. The Federal Statute of Limitations for Penalties
The federal generic statute of limitations for penalties, 73 which
courts have applied to some EPA actions under the Act,74 also mer-
its consideration as an appropriate timeliness rule for citizen suits.
Through this provision, Congress created an exception to the gen-
eral rule exempting the sovereign from statutes of limitations. 75
Statutes specifically limiting actions by the United States place the
government in the same position as private parties, eliminating the
inequities resulting from government immunity from time
limitations. 76
The courts have applied section 2462 to penalty and forfeiture
actions brought by the government under a host of federal stat-
utes, 77 including the Clean Water Act.78 Courts narrowly construe
section 2462 to apply "only to actions on behalf of the United States
and qui tam actions. ' ' 79 The same statute of limitations should gov-
period it does not intend that courts apply an unlimited period), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 821
(1961); see also Einhorn & Feldman, Choosing a Statute of Limitations in Federal Securities
Actions, 25 MERCER L. REV. 497, 497 (1974); Special Project, supra note 46, at 1039;
Note, supra note 53, at 1131, 1140.
73 28 U.S.C. § 2462 (1982) provides that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by Act of
Congress, an action, suit or proceeding for the enforcement of any civil fine, penalty, or
forfeiture, pecuniary or otherwise, shall not be entertained unless commenced within
five years .... "
74 See infra note 78 and accompanying text.
75 See, e.g., United States v. Summerlin, 310 U.S. 414 (1940) (generally sovereign is
exempt from limitation statutes); United States v. Weaver, 207 F.2d 796, 798 (5th Cir.
1953) (§ 2462 is exception to general immunity of sovereign).
76 See United States v. Franklin Nat'l Bank, 376 F. Supp. 378, 383 (E.D.N.Y. 1973)
(reason for federal statute of limitations for contract actions is to eliminate unfairness).
For a discussion of the purposes and applicability of federal limitations, including
§ 2462, see S. REP. No. 1328, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966) (report on adoption of
§ 2415, federal statute of limitations for tort and contract actions), reprinted in 1966 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 2502.
77 See, e.g., United States v. Core Laboratories, Inc., 759 F.2d 480, 481 (5th Cir.
1985) (Export Administration Act); United States v. Advance Mach. Co., 547 F. Supp.
1085, 1089-91 (D. Minn. 1982) (Consumer Product Safety Act); United States v. Fire-
stone Tire & Rubber Co., 518 F. Supp. 1021, 1036-37 (N.D. Ohio 1981) (Gold Act);
FTC v. Lukens Steel Co., 454 F. Supp. 1182, 1185 n.2 (D.D.C. 1978) (Federal Trade
Commission Act); United States v. Argonaut Line, Inc., 33 F. Supp. 833, 834 (S.D.N.Y.
1940) (applying § 2462's predecessor to federal shipping laws).
78 See United States v. C & R Trucking Co., 537 F. Supp. 1080, 1083 (N.D. W. Va.
1982) (suit by EPA under § 311 of Act); cf. United States v. Outboard Marine Corp., 104
F.R.D. 405, 409 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (dictum) (EPA suggests § 2462 bars suit under § 309 of
Act), rev'd on other grounds, 789 F.2d 497 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 457 (1986);
United States v. Central Soya, Inc., 697 F.2d 165, 169 (7th Cir. 1982) (suit by EPA under
Rivers and Harbors Act, Clean Water Act's predecessor).
79 Bertha Bldg. Corp. v. National Theatres Corp., 269 F.2d 785, 788-89 (2d Cir.
1959) (suit for treble damages under federal antitrust laws), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 960
(1960); see also Payne v. A.O. Smith Corp., 578 F. Supp. 733, 736 n.3 (S.D. Ohio 1983)
(§ 2462 does not govern suit brought by private individual for damages under Con-
sumer Product Safety Act); Erie Basin Metal Prods., Inc. v. United States, 150 F. Supp.
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ern suits seeking to impose the same penalty, whether the suit is qui
tam or brought by the government, "because they are equally
brought to enforce the criminal law of the State."80
Courts have historically refused to expand section 2462, be-
yond qui tam actions, to include actions for recovery of damages by
private parties.8 1 The words "fine, penalty, or forfeiture" in section
2462 refer to a punishment imposed as a sanction for violation of
federal law. Punishment unrelated to the plaintiff's loss but exacted
for some act of the defendant is considered punitive.8 2 Penalties
never include liability imposed as damages or as compensation for
an injury.83
C. Conflict in the District Courts over the Proper Limitation
Period for Citizen Suits
Recent enforcement actions in Maryland, New York, New
Jersey, Connecticut, and California presented district courts with
the need to select the proper limitation period under the Act.8 4 In
561, 566 (Ct. Cl. 1957) (§ 2462 applies only to actions instituted by United States, not to
claims by contractor against United States).
A qui tam action is brought by an informer under a statute which establishes a pen-
alty for its violation. The informer recovers a share of the penalty; the remainder goes
to the government. See Connecticut Action Now, Inc. v. Roberts Plating Co., 457 F.2d
81, 83-84 (2d Cir. 1972) (defines qui tam).
80 See Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 673 (1892) (actions by common informer
to recover penalty may stand on same ground as suits brought by state); see also Adams v.
Woods, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 336 (1805) (same time limits apply to qui tam actions as to
those brought by state).
81 Meeker v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 236 U.S. 412, 423 (1915) (§ 2462's predecessor
does not apply to action brought by shipper for damages under act regulating com-
merce); Bertha Bldg. Corp. v. National Theatres Corp., 269 F.2d 785, 788-89 (2d Cir.
1959) (§ 2462 inapplicable in suit for treble damages under antitrust laws), cert. denied,
361 U.S. 960 (1960); Payne v. A.O. Smith Corp., 578 F. Supp. 733, 736 n.3 (S.D. Ohio
1983) (§ 2462 does not apply to private action for damages under Consumer Product
Safety Act); Erie Basin Metal Prods., Inc. v. United States, 150 F. Supp. 561, 566 (Ct. Cl.
1957) (§ 2462 does not apply to action by contractor to recover damages from United
States).
82 For a discussion of the meaning of "penalty," see generally Huntington v. Attrill,
146 U.S. 657, 666-76 (1892); United States v. Witherspoon, 211 F.2d 858, 860-61 (6th
Cir. 1954); American Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. G. A. Nichols Co., 173 F.2d 830, 833
(10th Cir. 1949).
83 See, e.g., United States v. Hougham, 364 U.S. 310, 313 (1960) (United States re-
covery under Surplus Property Act is "liquidated damages," not a penalty); United
States v. Perry, 431 F.2d 1020, 1024-25 (9th Cir. 1970) (recovery under Anti-Kickback
Act is compensatory; it only makes government whole).
84 See Student Pub. Interest Research Group of N.J., Inc. v. P.D. Oil & Chem. Stor-
age, Inc., 627 F. Supp. 1074 (D.N.J. 1986); Sierra Club v. Union Oil Co., 16 Envtl. L.
Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,005 (N.D. Cal. 1985); Connecticut Fund for the Env't v. Job
Plating Co., 623 F. Supp. 207 (D. Conn. 1985); Student Pub. Interest Research Group of
N.J., Inc. v. AT & T Bell Laboratories, 617 F. Supp. 1190 (D.N.J. 1985); Sierra Club v.
Simkins Indus., Inc., 617 F. Supp. 1120 (D. Md. 1985); Chesapeake Bay Found. v. Beth-
lehem Steel Corp., 608 F. Supp. 440 (D. Md. 1985); Student Pub. Interest Research
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each case, environmental groups alleged that the defendant industry
continually exceeded limitations specified in its discharge permit, vi-
olating section 301(a) of the Act.8 5 The respective plaintiffs filed
their actions under the citizen suit provision;8 6 each sought injunc-
tive relief and civil penalties. The defendants responded by moving
for partial summary judgment, pleading the statute of limitations as
a defense. The defendants asserted that, absent a limitation period
in the Act, the courts should borrow state statutes of limitations ap-
plicable to penalties or forfeitures.8 7 Before reaching the statute of
limitations issue, the courts first rejected the argument that the use
of the present tense ("in violation") in section 505(a)(1) meant that
citizens could only sue for ongoing, as opposed to past, violations.88
Five district courts applied section 2462's five-year statute of
limitations as the most appropriate limitation period.8 9 The courts'
Group of N.J., Inc. v. Tenneco Polymers, Inc., 602 F. Supp. 1394 (D.NJ. 1985); Student
Pub. Interest Research Group of NJ., Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 600 F. Supp. 1474 (D.N.J.
1985); Friends of the Earth v. Facet Enters. Inc., 618 F. Supp. 532 (W.D.N.Y. 1984);
Student Pub. Interest Research Group of N.J., Inc. v. Anchor Thread Co., 22 Env't Rep.
Gas. (BNA) 1150 (D.N.J. 1984).
85 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (1982).
86 Clean Water Act § 505, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1982).
87 See P.D. Oil, 627 F. Supp. at 1084 (urging use of New Jersey two-year statute of
limitations applicable to forfeitures under penal statute); AT & T, 617 F. Supp. at 1202
(same); Tenneco, 602 F. Supp. at 1398 (same); Monsanto, 600 F. Supp. at 1477 (same);
Anchor Thread, 22 Env't Rep. Gas. (BNA) at 1154 (same);Job Plating, 623 F. Supp. at 211
(urging use of Connecticut's one-year limitation for penalty actions or three-year limita-
tion for nuisance); Simkins, 617 F. Supp. at 1124 (urging application of Maryland's one
year limitation period for penalty suits); Bethlehem Steel, 608 F. Supp. at 447 (same); Facet
Enterprises, 618 F. Supp. at 535 (defendant claims that either federal five-year statute of
limitations for penalties, 28 U.S.C. § 2462 (1982), or New York's three-year limitation
for penalties applies).
In Union Oil, however, the defendants did not encourage the court to adopt a state
statute of limitations. Rather, they successfully argued that § 2462 applied and barred
liability for violations which had occurred more than five years before the action com-
menced. 16 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20,006.
88 See, e.g., AT & T, 617 F. Supp. at 1194-99. This interpretation of the words "in
violation" is significant. If we assume a five-year statute of limitations, this interpretation
allows citizens to sue for any violations which occurred within the past five years even if
the discharge has since stopped or has been brought into compliance with the relevant
standards. Any violations that occurred prior to the five-year period are protected by
the statute of limitations. For example, suppose a discharger committed violations for
six years but has complied for the past four years. A citizen could sue for only the last
year of violation; the previous five years of violations are outside the time limit.
The courts consistently refuse to apply state limitation periods because doing so
would violate the Act's underlying policies of consistency and uniformity. See id. at
1202-03; Simkins, 617 F. Supp. at 1124-25; Bethlehem Steel, 608 F. Supp. at 447; Tenneco,
602 F. Supp. at 1398-99; Monsanto, 600 F. Supp. at 1477; Anchor Thread, 22 Env't Rep.
Cas. (BNA) at 1154; infra notes 124-29 and accompanying text. The court in Facet Enter-
prises reserved the choice-of-law issue. 618 F. Supp. at 536 n.2.
89 See Union Oil, 16 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20,006;Job Plating, 623 F. Supp.
at 213; Simkins, 617 F. Supp. at 1125; Bethlehem Steel, 608 F. Supp. at 450; Facet Enterprises,
618 F. Supp. at 536.
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reasoning paralleled that employed in Chesapeake Bay Foundation v.
Bethlehem Steel Corp.90 First, the court found that section 2462 almost
certainly applies to EPA actions under the Act.9' Second, it rea-
soned that fulfilling the congressional goal of consistent enforce-
ment between EPA and citizen suits requires that citizen actions
meet the same five-year limit.92 The court noted that the similarity
of citizen suits to qui tam actions further supported its decision to
apply section 2462. 93
Five NewJersey district courts concluded that no statute of limi-
tations applies to citizen suits under the Act.94 The general analysis
followed by these courts is outlined in Student Public Interest Research
Group of New Jersey, Inc. v. AT & T Bell Laboratories.95 First, the court
cited the "dearth of authority for applying the federal five-year limit
to either citizen suits or EPA actions." 96 Next it noted that, under
New Jersey law, the New Jersey Department of Environmental Pro-
tection could bring an enforcement action at any time. 97 The court
concluded that "[i]f the five-year federal statute of limitations were
applied to citizen suits, . . . they would be hampered in a way state
efforts are not, and the clear policy favoring uniformity in enforce-
ment would be thwarted."98 Without clearly reaching the issue with
regard to EPA actions, the court decided that citizen suits should
have no time limits.99
In choosing an appropriate statute of limitations, each group of
courts focused on Congress's desire for uniform and consistent en-
forcement. The NewJersey courts emphasized consistency between
state and citizen enforcement. The others required consistency be-
tween federal and citizen enforcement. The different focuses pro-
duced different results.
90 608 F. Supp. 440 (D. Md. 1985).
91 Id. at 448. The court cited United States v. Central Soya, Inc., 697 F.2d 165, 169
(7th Cir. 1982), and United States v. C & R Trucking Co., 537 F. Supp. 1080, 1083 (N.D.
W. Va. 1982), as examples where courts applied § 2462 to punitive actions under the
environmental laws.
92 Bethlehem Steel, 608 F. Supp. at 448-49.
93 Id. at 449-50.
94 See P.D. Oil, 627 F. Supp. at 1084-85;AT & T, 617 F. Supp. at 1203; Tenneco, 602
F. Supp. at 1399; Monsanto, 600 F. Supp. at 1477-78 (relying on Tenneco without discuss-
ing § 2462's applicability); Anchor Thread, 22 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1154.
95 617 F. Supp. 1190 (D.NJ. 1985).
96 Id. at 1203.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Id.
208 [Vol. 72:195
1986] CLEAN WATER ACT- STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
II
CHOOSING A STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS UNDER THE CLEAN
WATER ACT
The conflict between the district courts should be resolved in a
manner consistent with the purpose and policies underlying the
Clean Water Act. The first question is whether the same limitation
period should apply to citizen and federal government suits. The
second is whether the courts should apply the federal generic pen-
alty statute or leave the time to bring enforcement actions
unlimited.
A. The Same Time Limitation Should Apply to Both Citizen
and Federal Government Suits
The statutory language and legislative history of the citizen suit
provision compel the application of the same statute of limitations
to both citizen and federal government suits. Application of differ-
ent time constraints would frustrate Congress's intent that citizen
and EPA enforcement be consistent, and that citizen suits not inter-
fere unduly with the EPA's enforcement discretion. The Act's provi-
sion of identical remedies for EPA and citizen suits further suggests
that the same time constraints should apply to both types of action.
Finally, the Act does not mandate identical state and citizen
enforcement.
Congress dearly intended consistent enforcement of both gov-
ernment and citizen actions under the Act.'00 The Senate report
states that "standards for which enforcement would be sought
either under administrative enforcement or through citizen enforce-
ment procedures are the same. Therefore the participation of citi-
zens in the courts seeking enforcement of water pollution control
requirements should not result in inconsistent policy."' 0 ' Although
this passage refers to substantive enforcement standards, such as ef-
fluent limitations, "inconsistent policy" would also result if different
procedural rules governed private and government actions. In
short, the extent of liability under the Act would vary depending
upon who brought suit.
Consider the result if a longer limitation period governed a citi-
zen plaintiff than governed a government plaintiff. The Act autho-
rizes civil penalties "not to exceed $10,000 per day of ..
violation"; 10 2 a citizen given a longer period in which to sue could
100 See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
101 S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., lst Sess. 80, reprintedin CLEAN WATER HISTORY,supra
note 16, at 1415, 1498.
102 Clean Water Act § 309(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) (1982).
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ask that the court impose much higher total penalties. A violator
would therefore have an advantage if sued by the government rather
than by a citizen. Similarly, the government would prefer to let a
citizen sue because greater penalties, payable to the United States,
would result. Conversely, if a shorter time limit applied to a citi-
zen's suit, the government would have the enforcement advantage.
Either situation would result in inconsistent enforcement and un-
dermine Congress's clear intent.
In addition, Congress did not want citizen suits to interfere with
the government's enforcement discretion. 10 3 Imposing a shorter
time limit on citizens than on the EPA would force a private individ-
ual suing under the Act "to give notice almost immediately after a
particular incident of non-compliance had occurred," 10 4 rather than
waiting to see whether administrative enforcement would prove ad-
equate. 105 A short time limit for citizens would compel the EPA to
respond to citizen actions rather than set its own enforcement pri-
orities. 106 Concurrent time periods for citizen and EPA actions
would decrease the opportunity for interference with federal discre-
tion, yet preserve the triggering effect of private suits. A citizen
could wait for the EPA to prompt state action or to bring a federal
enforcement action. If EPA action were not forthcoming, the indi-
vidual could commence a citizen suit. Because the Act requires that
a citizen notify the EPA and the state sixty days before filing suit, 10 7
the EPA has ample opportunity to initiate enforcement proceedings
of its own.
Section 505's language and the Act's structure further support
adopting the same statute of limitations for both citizen suits and
EPA enforcement actions. Section 505 explicitly authorizes the dis-
trict courts "to apply any appropriate civil penalties" under the fed-
103 See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text; infra note 106.
104 Chesapeake Bay Found. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 608 F. Supp. 440,448 (D. Md.
1985).
1o5 Save Our Sound Fisheries Ass'n v. Callaway, 429 F. Supp. 1136, 1143 (D.R.I.
1977) ("Congress put strong reliance on administrative enforcement, generally allowing
citizen enforcement only after the Administrator had an opportunity to [exercise] his
powers of enforcement .... "); see also supra notes 40-41 (citizen suits intended to supple-
ment, not displace, administrative enforcement).
106 See Mashaw, supra note 31, at 33 (citizen suits have potential to undermine
prosecutorial discretion); supra note 40 and accompanying text. Congress has affirmed
this position in recent debate over modifications to the Act. Proposed modifications
would require that citizens provide the EPA with copies of all complaints or consent
decrees filed under § 505, and would specifically make judgments in such cases non-
binding upon the United States unless it was a party. One proponent of these modifica-
tions argued that these provisions "will help to encourage more consistent enforcement
settlements [and] maintain the ability of the Government to set its own enforcement
priorities." 131 CONG. REC. E3569 (daily ed. July 26, 1985) (statement of Rep. Roe).
107 Clean Water Act § 505(b)(1)(A), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(A) (1982).
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eral enforcement section.' 08 This cross-referencing of citizen suit
penalties to the federal penalty provision suggests that Congress in-
tended that remedies available in citizen suits parallel those avail-
able in EPA suits. 10 9 For comparable penalties to exist, the same
temporal limitations should apply to suits brought by private citi-
zens and by the federal government."s0
The Act does not require procedural congruence between citi-
zen and state enforcement. In Student Public Interest Research Group of
New Jersey, Inc. v. AT & T Bell Laboratories,111 the court stated that
enforcement actions brought under the Act should not be subject to
time limits in order to ensure uniformity and consistency with state
enforcement actions that, in some states, are governed by no time
bar.1 2 This argument is flawed, however, because "[u]niformity [in
this context] means identical minimum standards,"113 not absolutely
identical pollution control requirements. If they so desire, states
may establish more stringent effluent limitations and enforcement
procedures than the federal government, 1 4 and may also authorize
citizen enforcement of state statutes. 115 State courts enforce state
pollution control laws, however, and state enforcement provisions
do not apply to suits brought in federal court under the Act. 116
Congress chose to require procedural consistency among all en-
108 Id. § 505(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1982). The federal enforcement provision is at
id. § 309, 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (1982).
109 For example, courts have relied upon the cross-referencing of citizen suit and
EPA enforcement penalties to hold that, under the citizen suit provision, penalties for
past violations may be imposed in § 505 actions. See, e.g., Chesapeake Bay Found. v.
Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd., 611 F. Supp. 1542, 1547-48 (E.D. Va. 1985), aft'd, 791
F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1986), petition for cert. filed, 55 U.S.L.W. 3239 (U.S. Sept. 23, 1986)
(No. 86-473).
110 See supra text accompanying note 102.
In addition, the statute indicates that only those penalties "appropriate" in an EPA
suit under Clean Water Act § 309(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) (1982), are "appropriate" in a
citizen suit under id. § 505(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1982).
111 617 F. Supp. 1190 (D.NJ. 1985).
112 Id. at 1203.
113 Id. (emphasis added).
114 See supra note 21.
115 Many states have authorized citizen suits under state water pollution control
laws. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 12600-12612 (West 1980); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 22a-
14 to -20 (1985); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 403.412 (West 1986); IND. CODE ANN. § 13-6-1-1 to -
6 (Burns 1981); MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 1-501 to -508 (1983); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. §§ 691.1201-.1207 (West Supp. 1986); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 116B.01-.13 (West
1977 & Supp. 1987); NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.540 (1983); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A:35A-1 to -14
(West Supp. 1986); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 34A-10-1 to -15 (1986).
116 A citizen suing under the federal citizen suit provision may obtain the relief au-
thorized by the Act; he or she may not sue under the federal statute and ask for relief
specified under state law. See supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text. State effluent
requirements that are more stringent than federal requirements are imported into fed-
eral law by the SPDES permit, which the EPA or citizens may enforce. See Clean Water
Act §§ 309, 505, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1319, 1365 (1982).
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forcement actions brought under the Act; it did not require such
consistency between similar actions brought under the Act and
under state pollution control laws.
Courts should recognize that by bringing legitimate actions
under section 505 "citizens [are] performing a public service." 117
They sue as private attorneys general, and any benefit inures to the
public or to the United States. 118 Under these circumstances, the
policies and structure of the Act demand that courts apply the same
statute of limitations to citizen actions and to federal administrative
actions. 1 19 The next step in the analysis is deciding what, if any, time
bar is appropriate.
B. Section 2462 Is the Most Appropriate Limitation Period for
Enforcement Actions Under the Act
Under section 309 or section 505 of the Act, the courts may
decide that the time to bring the action is unlimited, or may borrow
an analogous state or federal time limitation. 120 The most appropri-
ate choice is to borrow a timeliness rule from elsewhere in federal
law. A federal time bar best serves the policies of uniformity and
consistency that underlie the Act.
1. No Statute of Limitations
If courts apply no time bar, enforcement suits brought under
the Act will threaten the fairness, stability, and efficiency that stat-
utes of limitations provide. 121 While applying no time bar to citizen
suits promotes consistency with state enforcement, it flouts Con-
gress's decision to sacrifice consistency between state and citizen en-
forcement in favor of nationwide uniformity. t 22 Furthermore,
Congress expressly imposed a time limit on federal statutory pen-
alty actions through section 2462,123 indicating a clear desire to
limit federal causes of action. Therefore, courts should not alto-
gether dispense with a time bar for citizen suits under the Act.
117 116 CONG. REC. 42,386 (1970) (exhibit 1, summary of provisions of conference
agreement on Clean Air Amendments of 1970), reprinted in CLEAN AIR HISTORY, supra
note 40, at 136.
118 See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
119 See, e.g., Chesapeake Bay Found. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 608 F. Supp. 440,449
(D. Md. 1985) (same limitation should apply to citizen and federal administrative ac-
tion); Friends of the Earth v. Facet Enters., Inc., 618 F. Supp. 532, 536 (W.D.N.Y. 1984)
(same).
120 See supra notes 53-72 and accompanying text.
121 See supra notes 46-52 and accompanying text.
122 See supra notes 111-16 and accompanying text.
123 See supra notes 73-83 and accompanying text.
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2. State Statutes of Limitations
Congress encouraged uniform time limits primarily to prevent
states from competing for industry by lowering their pollution con-
trol requirements.1 24 Borrowing state time limitations would frus-
trate that aim. Use of state time bars would result in nonuniform
enforcement of citizen suits from state to state, 125 and would "allow
the industrial equivalent of forum shopping." 126 Recognizing the
danger to effective and uniform enforcement of the Act, district
courts have consistently refused to apply state time bars to section
505 suits. 1 27 Instead, they have either drawn timeliness rules from
elsewhere in federal law128 or refrained from applying any time
bar. 129
3. Application of Section 2462 to EPA Suits
The federal five-year statute of limitations for penalties' 3 0 is the
most appropriate time limitation found in federal law to govern EPA
suits under the Act. Through section 2462, Congress explicitly re-
quires the federal government to begin actions for "the enforce-
ment of any civil . . . penalty"'131 within five years,' 32 unless
124 See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
125 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 340 (West 1982 & Supp. 1986) (one year);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-2-211 (1985) (two years); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 213 (McKin-
ney 1972 & Supp. 1986) (six years).
126 118 CONG. REc. 10,206 (1972) (statement of Rep. Harsha), reprinted in CLEAN
WATER HISTORY, supra note 16, at 356; see also Student Pub. Interest Research Group of
NJ., Inc. v. AT & T Bell Laboratories, 617 F. Supp. 1190, 1202 (D.NJ. 1985) ("The
major purpose of the policy favoring uniformity is to prevent states from trying to out-
bid their neighbors for industries and jobs by maintaining lower pollutions standards.");
Chesapeake Bay Found. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 608 F. Supp. 440, 447 (D. Md. 1985)
("If courts were to borrow state statutes of limitations... [s]ome states could choose...
a very brief statute of limitations, and thus be very hospitable to industries that violate
the Act, while others could adjust their limitations periods to provide a more hostile
attitude towards possible polluters.").
127 See cases cited supra note 88.
128 See cases cited supra note 89; cf. DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters,
462 U.S. 151, 155 (1983) (drawing time limitation from Labor Management Relations
Act); Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 372 (1977) (applying doctrine of
laches in suit brought under Equal Employment Opportunity Act).
129 See cases cited supra note 94.
130 28 U.S.C. § 2462 (1982).
131 Id.
132 Id. Both the courts and Congress have construed § 2462's language to mean
that the limitation period begins to run on the date of violation. The cases interpreting
§ 2462 and its predecessors unquestionably support this proposition. See, e.g., United
States v. Core Laboratories, Inc., 759 F.2d 480, 482 (5th Cir. 1985) (citing cases). Contra
United States Dep't of Labor v. Old Ben Coal Co., 676 F.2d 259 (7th Cir. 1982) (under
Coal Act, claim accrues after violator fails to pay penalty imposed by administration).
In 1965 Congress indicated approval of this interpretation. A report addressing
amendments to the Export Control Act of 1949, contained the following statement:
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
"otherwise provided by Act of Congress." 133 Actions brought by
the EPA under section 309 of the Clean Water Act are within the
scope of section 2462.134
The purpose and effect of the penalties imposed under the Act
are analogous to the circumstances that the five-year statute of limi-
tations is expressly intended to reach. The word "penalty" in sec-
tion 2462 refers to a sanction imposed for violation of a public law,
not a liability imposed as damages for a private injury.135 The rele-
vant language of the Act fits this definition. Deterrence, not com-
pensation, is the primary goal of the penalties available through
section 309 of the Act. 136 Penalties are calculated on the basis of the
"economic benefit of noncompliance"' 137 and "the seriousness of
the violation."' 38 Both of these components seek to deter future
violations; they do not attempt to compensate for individual or pub-
lic injury.' 3 9 This penalty is precisely the type to which courts have
historically applied the five year time bar.140
Government penalty actions are exempt from section 2462 only
The bill does not prescribe any period following an offense within
which the civil penalty must be imposed. It is intended that the general
5-year limitation imposed by section 2462 of title 28 shall govern. Under
that section, the time is reckoned from the commission of the act giving rise to the
liability, and not from the time of imposition of the penalty, and it is applicable to
administrative as well as judicial proceedings.
S. REP. No. 363, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (emphasis added), reprinted in 1965 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 1826, 1832. See also Developments, supra note 46, at 1200-01 (where
the act is wrong, regardless of damage, statute of limitations begins to run moment act is
committed).
The plaintiff, however, may be entitled to invoke the equitable doctrine of fraudu-
lent concealment to toll the limitation period. See Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S.
392, 397 (1946) ("This equitable doctrine is read into every federal statute of limita-
tion."); Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U.S. 135, 143 (1879) (establishing standards for plead-
ing fraudulent concealment); Dayco Corp. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 523 F.2d
389, 394 (6th Cir. 1975) (statement of standards for fraudulent concealment). The
court will allow a suit to proceed after the limitation period has run if the plaintiff can
prove that the defendant has fraudulently concealed the facts forming the basis of the
violation, and that the plaintiff was not negligent in failing to discover the violation. See
Holmberg, 327 U.S. at 396 (unfair to bar claim if defendant's fraud caused delay); Wood,
101 U.S. at 139 (doctrine imported from equity).
133 28 U.S.C. § 2462 (1982).
134 See supra notes 77-83 and accompanying text.
135 See supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
136 See Environmental Protection Agency Civil Penalty Policy, [Fed. Laws] Env't Rep. (BNA)
41:2991 (Feb. 16, 1984) [hereinafter EPA Penalty Policy]. Although this policy does not
bind courts, they have used it as a guideline for arriving at civil penalties. See, e.g., Ches-
apeake Bay Found. v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd., 611 F. Supp. 1542, 1556 (E.D. Va.
1985), aff'd, 791 F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1986), petition for cert. filed, 55 U.S.L.W. 3239 (U.S.
Sept. 23, 1986) (No. 86-473).
137 EPA Penalty Policy, supra note 136, at 41:2992.
138 Id.
139 Id.
140 See supra notes 79-83 and accompanying text.
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if Congress states that the particular action is unlimited or provides
another time limitation in the underlying statute.' 4 1 The Act con-
tains neither of these exceptions, 42 nor does the legislative history
hint at any intent to do so. One court stated that "the general policy
of statutes of limitations is so deeply ingrained in our legal system
that a period of limitation made generally applicable .... as is sec-
tion 2462, is not to be avoided unless that purpose is made mani-
festly clear.'143
Cases decided under the Act support the application of section
2462 to EPA penalty suits. Although courts have not specifically ap-
plied the five year time bar to section 309 actions, they have im-
posed section 2462 and other federal limitation statutes in
analogous situations. One district court applied section 2462 in a
case brought by the EPA to collect penalties for an oil spill 144 under
section 311 (b) (6) of the Act. 45 Courts have also applied the federal
time limitations for contract 146 and tort 147 actions to EPA cost re-
covery actions under section 311 (f) 148 of the Act. These cases prop-
erly concluded that Congress did not exempt the Act from general
federal statutes of limitations. Thus, the federal five-year statute of
limitations should apply to EPA penalty suits under the Act.
4. Application of Section 2462 to Citizen Suits
If federal enforcement actions are limited to five years, this
Note's conclusion that the same limitation period should apply to
both EPA and citizen's suits requires that courts similarly apply the
five-year statute of limitations to citizen suits under the Act.
Although courts have not previously applied section 2462 to citizen
suits, 14 9 the historical interpretation of section 2462, the rationale
behind that section, and the policies of the Act all support such an
application.
Courts have historically refused to apply section 2462 to suits
141 See 28 U.S.C. § 2462 (1982).
142 See generally Clean Water Act §§ 101-518, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982 & Supp.
III 1985).
143 H.P. Lambert Co. v. Secretary of the Treasury, 354 F.2d 819, 822 (1st Cir. 1965).
144 United States v. C & R Trucking Co., 537 F. Supp. 1080 (N.D. W. Va. 1982).
145 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(6) (1982).
146 See, e.g., United States v. P/B STCO 213, 756 F.2d 364, 370 (5th Cir. 1985) (six
year contract limitation of 28 U.S.C. § 2415(a) (1982) applied).
147 See, e.g., United States v. The Barge Shamrock, 635 F.2d 1108 (4th Cir. 1980)
(noting district court applied three year tort limitation of 28 U.S.C. § 2415(b) (1982) to
hold claim time-barred, but reversing district court because claim arose within limitation
period), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 830 (1981).
148 33 U.S.C. § 1321(f) (1982).
149 See Student Pub. Interest Research Group of NJ., Inc. v. AT & T Bell Laborato-
ries, 617 F. Supp. 1190, 1203 (D.N.J. 1985); Chesapeake Bay Found. v. Bethlehem Steel
Corp., 608 F. Supp. 440, 449 (D. Md. 1985).
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brought by private parties, except in qui tam actions.1 50 The cases
limiting application of section 2462, however, all arose before the
advent of citizen suits. 51 A citizen suit is a perfect analog to a qui
tam action. In both actions, the plaintiff sues in place of the govern-
ment to enforce a federal law, and the government collects the pen-
alty in whole or in part. Indeed, the citizen suit is even more similar
to a suit by the government than a qui tam action because the United
States receives the entire penalty. Thus, section 2462 is at least as
applicable to the newly developed citizen suit as to the qui tam
action.
The rationale for limiting government penalty actions1 52 ap-
plies equally when citizens sue to collect the same penalties. Re-
quiring citizens to bring actions against violators in a timely manner
enhances the fairness, efficiency, and effectiveness of the legal sys-
tem. Moreover, allowing citizens an unlimited time to sue defeats
the purpose of imposing limitations on EPA actions. Section 505
permits the United States to intervene in any citizen suit; 153 by inter-
vening in an unlimited citizen suit, the EPA could circumvent Con-
gress's intent that the government sue for penalties within five
years. 154
Congress indicated through section 2462 that federal govern-
ment penalty actions should be limited. 155 It also intended that
penalty actions by both citizens and the federal government under
the Act be similarly enforced. 156 Together, these policies suggest
that adopting the five year limitation period best implements con-
gressional intent. 157 Furthermore, by applying a time limit, the legal
150 See supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
151 See cases cited supra notes 79 & 81.
152 See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
153 See Clean Water Act § 505(c)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(c)(2) (1982).
154 See supra notes 130-48 and accompanying text.
155 See supra notes 73-83 and accompanying text.
156 See supra notes 100-02 and accompanying text.
157 Requiring that enforcement actions under the Act be filed within five years cre-
ates a danger that some violations will go unpunished. This danger is offset somewhat
by the courts' ability to apply the equitable doctrine of fraudulent concealment. See supra
note 132. The Supreme Court has confirmed that courts retain their equitable discre-
tion under the Act: "That the scheme [of the act] as a whole contemplates the exercise
of discretion and balancing of equities militates against the conclusion that Congress
intended to deny courts their traditional equitable discretion in enforcing the statute."
Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 316 (1982). If a court finds that a defend-
ant has misreported or failed to report any information required under the Act, and the
violation was not discovered in time to file suit, the court may toll the running of the
statute.
If the limitation period does run on a violation this occurrence should not greatly
hinder the overall goal of pollution abatement, see Clean Water Act § 301, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1311 (1982), or the deterrent effect of penalties. See EPA Penalty Policy, supra note 136.
If the violations continue throughout an initial five-year period, new opportunities for
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system reaps the benefits of fairness, stability, and efficiency that
limitation periods offer. 158 In the often quoted words of ChiefJus-
tice Marshall, "In a country where not even treason can be prose-
cuted after a lapse of three years, it could scarcely be supposed that
an individual would remain forever liable to a pecuniary
forfeiture."1 59
CONCLUSION
Citizen suits have become an important adjunct to EPA and
state enforcement of the Clean Water Act. Congress, however, did
not provide a statute of limitations applicable to citizen suits under
the Act, leaving the issue for courts to decide. The normal practice
of borrowing a state time bar would result in inconsistent citizen
enforcement among the states and would frustrate the policies of
uniformity and consistency which underlie the Act. On the other
hand, allowing a private cause of action to live indefinitely would
result in inconsistent enforcement between EPA and citizen suits
and would sacrifice the benefits of fairness, stability, and efficiency
that limitation periods offer.
The most appropriate limitation period is the generic federal
five-year statute of limitations for penalty actions. Through this stat-
ute, Congress expressly limited the time within which the govern-
ment must collect any federal statutory penalties. This limitation
should govern penalty actions brought by the EPA under the Act.
Because Congress intended that citizen suits and EPA actions be
similarly enforced, the same five year time limitation should govern
citizens who sue under the Act.
Carie Goodman McKinney
enforcement will constantly arise. If, on the other hand, no violation has occurred for
five years, then the pollution will have abated, rendering enforcement action unneces-
sary. See Hudson River Sloop Clearwater, Inc. v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 591 F. Supp.
345, 353 (N.D.N.Y. 1984) ("If compliance, within reason, is the end, the means chosen
to achieve that end are less important, particularly where, as here, that end has been
realized."), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Friends of the Earth v. Consolidated Rail Corp.,
768 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1985).
158 See supra notes 46-52 and accompanying text.
159 Adams v. Woods, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 336, 342 (1805).
217
